Мэдыі ў посткамуністычных грамадзтвах: аб’ектыўная інфармацыя супраць ідэалягічных скажэньняў
Матэрыялы міжнароднай канфэрэнцыі, Менск, 18-19 кастрычніка 2002 г.
Кніга па англійску - Mass audience and ideological impact: Belarus case
Valiantsin AKUDOVICH, Belarusian Association of Journalists, Belarusian Collegium
MEDIA AS A MYTHS FACTORY OR THE STUDY OF ONE AESTHETIC DEFEAT
In the earliest times, myth was the only information medium to present the whole world picture. Thousands years have passed since then, bringing about drastic changes in this scheme. The Information itself has now become a dominant myth of the modern times, with the mass media performing a function of the principle creator, codifier and a safeguard of diverse myths, both global and regional. This happened because the media — (not the traditional myth-making institutes like religion, culture and ideology) — appeared to be the most capable of integrating the insanely scattered work of the world into the paranoiac whole, or a myth, in the situation of the communication outburst. Therefore, I will dare say this morning that today’s main role of the media is not the production and sale of information, but, namely, the production of myths. And, if the so-formulated version indeed makes sense, we should take into account this fundamental role of the media when carrying out a concrete analysis of their operation. Naturally, this also relates to the overview of the media workings in the post-Communist Belarus. For, if we forget that all our media have been in this way or another involved in creating the single Big Myth, eclectically named “Belarus”, all our attempts to differentiate ideological distortions and the objective information will remain “the thing in itself” and will rather confuse the general media situation, than help clear it up. Furthermore, by playing down the media problems to simply political and legal aspects (even if they are extremely painful and topical for us), we unwisely overshadow the mission, with which our media were sacrally pregnant after the Belarusian literature (the progenitor of nation) had exhausted its myth-creating potential.
As we know very well, the process of shaping a full-fledged Belarusian myth is yet to be completed. By the way, unlike the Poles, the Balts or Russians, we do not have a very clear understanding of what it looked like, not to mention the foreigners, which come across us in either real or virtual spaces. The reason for that is obvious. In contrast to the Poles, the Balts or the Russians, who had gotten into the Communist empire with already shaped myths about themselves and who needed only to shake off the Communist peelings after the collapse of the empire, Belarusans, who had not had the previously obtained myth wear, faced the bare independence in 1991.
If we reflect on this very carefully, we will understand that that was a dreadful situation. One could compare it with the situation of a person, who has suddenly noticed that he did not have a shadow. He seemed to be just like anybody else, but without a shadow; therefore, he had no trust in his own life.
To make a story short, the newly independent country was in desperate need for a national myth. And, Belarusian media rushed to try different measures and fashion styles on it, although the nationally oriented dress was obviously the trendiest back then. Actually, however, the fashion for national dress passed shortly, just like the one for the Communist and liberal or any other wear for the national myth. And we got stuck in a situation, when during many years only two media groupings — the state-sponsored and opposition press — fought for their vision of the Belarusian myth on the basis of pure opposition to each other. It would be more correct to call the opposition press the non-state press, but in the situation of the today’s Belarus, not only the media, but also everything, not associated with the state, becomes opposition.
If we draw a scheme of those competing myths, which are trying today to portray the space of the one and the same geopolitical precedent, we will get a classical binary position: light-darkness, innocence-violence, wellbeing-poverty, etc… In other words, the myth-making of the state media completely focused on the positive images: heroic nation, economic achievements, political stability, excellent roads, brilliant sportsmen, high level of education, free health care, housing construction projects, festivals, songs…
The opposition media based their myth-making strategy on the negative images: dictatorship, totalitarianism, Kurapaty graves, economic collapse, betrayal of national interest, death squads, corruption, Soviet mentality and reality, kolkhoz, no prospects…and ad infinitum.
We completely avoid here the political ferment, which restored the both myths, namely: Belarus should be obliged exclusively to Alexander Lukashenka for the rise of the country, according to the state media; Belarus should be obliged to the same Alexander Lukashenka for its decay, according to the opposition media. The political problems do not mater much here. Not because they hardly exist. Rather, it is absolutely not essential for the national Myth on what political basement it arises, because any conceptual myth is neither the political nor even an ideological event. This event is informational and aesthetic.
I will underline: informational and aesthetic. The latter equally concerns both the biblical myth about the creation of the world and every modern myth, be it Chernobyl or Microsoft. But, if it is more or less clear with the informational component of the myth — information here should be significant, the aesthetic component of the myth is more difficult to formalize.
I realize clearly that our conference is not devoted to aesthetic issues, But, since I am going to say soon that the opposition media in Belarus has lost the fight for their vision of the national myth to the state-run media (which had lost their fight long before) not politically, ideologically or due to the permanent administrative and legal pressure by the authorities, but aesthetically, I cannot do without a few words about the aesthetic component itself.
Whatever newsy the event might be, it would become a myth only on condition of being fixed in attractive and sticking-to-the-memory forms. However, it is impossible to realize here that being aesthetic does not necessarily mean being beautiful. Kant formulated long ago the presence of the “aesthetics of the sinister”, which makes possible such myths as Apocalypses, Dracula or Khatyn and beside its informational component. Myth is maybe not the greatness of beauty, but the beauty of the greatness, although horrible and sinister, for sure. (On 9/11 last year, American media created one of such myths, when they collapsed WTC twin towers before our very eyes. This was a nightmare, yet what a beautiful nightmare. Since it was beautiful, it immediately became one of the brightest myths of the new millenium. By the way, I was not mistaken when I said: “Media…collapsed…” Because, although the terrorists attacked the towers, it was the media which created a “beautiful nightmare”. They created it deliberately, avoiding or hiding the nightmare of human debris, as consumers were indeed not interested in the truth of the life. They were interested in beautiful myths; the more horrible they were, the better.)
Getting back to the opposition between the state-run and opposition media in Belarus, one should state that the defeat of the latter was preconditioned, as they had been basing their vision of the national myth on something which cannot be perceived as aesthetic and thus cannot be a myth: rotten country, miserable society, cowed people, clumsy opposition, stupid leadership… It seems that the only success of the opposition media in the context of creating a Belarusian myth is the demonization of Lukashenka in the framework of the aesthetics of the ugly: Lukashenka is not the Dracula yet, but he is no longer “the ordinary president”, either. (Allusion to the documentary by Belarus film director Yury Khashchevatsky). Since the efforts by the state media (with the plus sign) and the opposition media (with the minus sign) matched, we eventually gained an exclusively efficient and effective result, owing to which the personal myth of Alexander Lukashenka alone has continued to represent Belarus both internationally and — what is more surprising — to Belarusans themselves.
In all other respects, the opposition media turned out to be completely disoriented. They were only able to display a sad skepticism towards at least some myth-making efforts by the state-run media: “Slavic Bazaar (music festival) is a profanation; Dazhynki (harvest festival) is a stupidity; the new railway terminal is gigantism, the National Library is a show-off, the Olympic champion is an easy win…
Perhaps, it is indeed an easy win; perhaps, critical analysts from the opposition media were irreproachable in terms of factual logical accuracy. Yet, it did not prevent them from getting estranged by information consumers. Could it be different? Who needs, who could be interested in that dismal Belarus, which the opposition press painted in gray colors day after day? And a mass reader, which had already longed in his collective subconsciousness for a beautiful and bright myth about himself and his country, had a point when he decided to escape from that uncomfortable paper foreign land to the more attractive information spaces.
I do not know whether the opposition media have finally begun to understand their conceptual mistake, but it seems that the key opposition publications (the ones which have not yet been closed down by the authorities) have started to search carefully, yet not refusing from criticism against the authorities, for themselves in the direction, which can be quite accurately described by the formula “From the opposition to the national press”. If we paraphrase this slogan to fit our context, it will sound as follows: “From a sum of the opposition between one another towards the national myth”.
Although the majority of non-state media is surely to continue supporting resistance to the current regime, while Lukashenka remains at power, I still want to believe that they will have enough wit not to project automatically this resistance against the country and the society which are burdened with this regime.
Finally, Belarusian media have not yet learned to realize that the fate of Belarus in the twenty first century depends not on politicians, economists or God, but on the media magnates and media employees. We live in a world where the real existence of a nation, a country or whoever is not ensured by a personal existence. It is ensured by the presence of its projection in the information space. Without this sustainable projection, nobody will ever believe in the authenticity of anything. Just like the man without his shadow does not believe himself.
Liavon BARSZCZEŰSKI, Belarusian P.E.N.-Center
THE RECURRENCES OF THE PAST OR THE POST-SOVIET MEDIA-CRACY
In the book “L’explosion de la communication” (The Explosion of Communication”), now also available in Belarusian, authors Philippe Breton and Serge Proulx wrote:
“The legitimacy of the power in our liberal society is now ensured by the eloquence of mass media: the ability to use the mass media is becoming a necessary precondition for success in politics. The significance, which public opinion polls and advertising have attained while shaping an image of a public figure, leads to the growing value of a fact of communication against its content. After all, it is not important what a candidate talks about during an electoral campaign. It is important, though, that he/she is perceived as a person who wants to tell something, ideally, in a form of a friendly dialogue. Political advertising in this case obviously ensures an expansion of the dominant communication ideology in the society”. (Breton Ph., Proulx S. The Explosion of Communication // Translated from French. —Minsk, 1995, —p. 135—134).
In this work by authors, who live in a democratic society, we can see the actual recognition of the fact that this society is no longer democratic, but, to a very large extent, is a mediacratic one. It means that the currently all-powerful media determine the nature of the power as well as the methods of realizing its function. One can put it differently: the power is formally elected by a civil society, yet in reality, this choice is pre-determined by the work of the media. Let us not forget that we are talking about a society, shaped evolutionary and based on a democratic development trend. Tradition — the sustainability of political tastes of smaller communities (e.g. family); finding time by an average man to read politics sections in a newspaper; and first of all, the trust that his choice matters for his concrete daily life in the future — also puts a significant influence on the political choice of a member of such a society.
Are the described factors present in the consciousness of an average man in a post-Soviet society? The research, conducted by political scientist and political psychologist Uladzimir Padhol with our modest participation (in: Padhol U. Political Psychology Basics. Materials for People’s University students. —Minsk, 1999), allows us to talk about a special totalitarian mentality of a Belarusian — a person who unexpectedly found itself in the post-Soviet epoch.
MENTALITY is a notion, which reflects a combination of complicated motivational complexes and actual actions of a human being. The presence of psychological structures and orientations, which people are not always aware of, is the deep-laid basis of any mentality. Such structures and orientations are thoroughly analyzed in the works of E. Fromm (e.g. in: Fromm E. Escape from Freedom. —New York, 1941 or in: Fromm E. A Man for Himself. —Minsk, 1992).
By influencing on a person ideologically, totalitarian system aims to turn people into sadomasochists, who get pleasure from obeying the system or from holding the fates of their subordinates. The system aims to override a human being completely. To do so, it destroys culture and estranges a human being from it, creating a totalitarian subculture instead. The system shapes in the souls of those subdued an aggressive attitude and a destructive orientation towards the dissent.
The eradication of national culture as a meta-language and the language itself along with its sub-cultural hypnotic layer (sayings, greetings, curses, jokes) can be compared with eradication of humus, which, as it is known, has built up for millions of years. While humus contains all the elements necessary for plants, hypnotic layer of the national sub-culture fosters the socialization of an individual and its transformation into a personality. Without this layer, only mankurts grow, becoming “the soldiers of the empire” after being exposed to a proper ideological brainwashing.
Every historic epoch and every society shape their mentality structure. One can judge about the fundamental elements of the mentality of Belarusians in the Great Duchy of Litva from the statements by philosopher and publicist A.Volian: “Freedom is the most beautiful people’s thing. Slavery is even worse than death” (A quote from: Saverchanka I. Book and Writing Culture of Belarus. —Minsk, 1998, —p. 60). Volian gave examples when “people voluntarily opted for death in order not to get into captivity”. And he connected the notion of “freedom” with “law”: “There is no freedom where there is no law”.
Many wars have since swept across Belarus. The authority and ideologies, which, however, often turned out to be alien and aggressive, changed. Over the past several centuries, the Belarusian nation has become an object of destroying influence from four mentally foreign systems:
1. Russian tsarism, which carried out genocide during aggressive wars, in which every second Belarusian perished; after the occupation and partition of the Great Duchy of Litva, they also started eradicating the Belarusian identity at both state and cultural level. 2. Interwar Poland. The policy of Polonization and erasing Belarusian identity from people’s memory. 3. Germany under Hitler. Genocide. 4. Soviet Russia. Genocide and eradication of ethnic intelligentsia and culture followed by a total transformation of the mentality towards creating “a new community of people — the Soviet people”.
In 1986 we observed genocide again, with children sent to a May Day demonstration under the Chernobyl X-rays, with Moscow-bound radioactive clouds downed on Mahileu province. As a result, physical and spiritual existence of Belarusians has been placed under threat.
Today we can also talk about hypnotic information technologies, with the help of which specific consciousness and sub-consciousness structures are being imposed on the nation. Normally, it is a two-way process. First, national sub-culture with its traditionally formed and peculiar hypnotic elements is eradicated. Secondly, people are imposed the qualities, which they have allegedly possessed since the very dawn of the nation (tolerance, gentleness, etc.). Ideological myths and social idols are the means of hypnotic influence on the nation’s mentality.
It is natural for modern Belarusians to have many elements of totalitarian and post-totalitarian mentality, which has taken shape under the influence of the double totalitarian system. This includes the national totalitarism of eastern neighbors, which aims to destroy the Belarusian culture and sub-culture, and convince Belarusians that they, in fact, are the same as Russians, and the colonial totalitarism, the function of which is to annex Belarus as a state to the imperial Russia. That is where a stubborn struggle of the totalitarian system against the rebirth of the Belarusian language and culture comes from. At the same time, authentic features of Belarusian mentality, which are still preserved deep in the consciousness and genetic memory of national culture bearers do exist.
The main characteristic features of the mentality of a large part of our compatriots include:
• an absolute domination of irrational belief, first of all, in political miracles; • the fear of losing — as a result of participation in the political life — their prosperity (although, minimal), health, even life; • feeling themselves unprotected from the state machinery; • the lack of will and action, which can change the situation; • the lack of trust in their own forces; • isolation in the world of their personal problems; • hostile attitude to the attempts of other members of the society to organize themselves; • aggressiveness directed in the first place at the people who do not fear and who do not follow the majority, etc.
Many opposition politicians and publicists are committing a serious mistake by misunderstanding and ignoring in their actions the above-mentioned features of the mentality of a post-Soviet Belarusian, or in romanticizing its image. It appears that under the influence of humanistic literature, which we read in a high school, a university and upon graduation, we tend to think that a large part of our compatriots can go beyond a usual pragmatism and be filled with idealism in a positive sense of the word. However, political psychologists have quite convincingly exhibited that ideological myths in the mentality are of an extremely solid nature, and it is not easy to change them.
Apparently, here should we seek answers to the questions from our recent political past and reality. Let us recall some of them. For instance, why did not the 12 April 1995 severe beating of Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) deputies in the parliament building cause a public outcry from our citizens? On the contrary, BPF politicians gained less support in the parliamentary elections, which took place one month after the beating. I also wonder why the majority of population did not support a humanistic program of Uladzimir Hancharyk, the opposition single candidate who based his campaign on the disappearances of high-profile opposition figures. Finally, why do the circulation of opposition papers, which polls suggest people trust not less than the regime’s newspapers, keep going down, while the circulation of state-sponsored publications remain quite stable?
I will try to answer these questions generally, on the assumption of those ideological myths common for the mentality of a large portion of Belarusian population. Belarusian citizens treat any power as an instrument of pressure and violence over a human being. They irrationally do not believe that the authority would take an initiative of doing something good and useful for them. They treat any authority as being an occupational one, which is mortally dangerous to touch upon or to make it pay special attention to you. At the same time, it is not shameful to deceive or fool it. It is also good to be close to the power, again in order to solve your private problems or at least neutralize part of threats, which such an authority bears. Furthermore, any other person, not connected to you or your relatives, automatically becomes your competitor when he gets into the power system, because he is taking your place, which, at least theoretically, you or your relatives could occupy. That is why the beating of deputies and their forceful eviction from the parliament building or the disappearances of Viktar Hanchar or Yury Zakharanka, is perceived by this part of the population as something natural. For, in their opinion, only the strongest, most brutal and most cunning get a win in their fight for power. The population I am describing now opt to read presidential daily Sovietskaya Belorussia or a Golas Liozninshchyna. And it does NOT read independent Narodnaya Volya or Brest Courier, since the only reason for them to read a newspaper is to forecast (according to the primary source) what they could expect from the authorities and how to avoid potential danger. They cannot find such practical information in Narodnaya Volya or Belaruskaya Delovaya Gazeta. They simply have neither need nor desire to read about abstract things like “anti-popular regime” or “the need for defending the Belarusian statehood”.
I would also like to draw your attention to basic differences in understanding of a free-society media-cracy and a totalitarian media-cracy, which still looks ahead with confidence in Belarus and several other post-Soviet countries in East Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Though having certain limitations, a western media-cracy still gives a chance to alternative political forces, an alternative political thought to influence on the society. This is achieved thanks to the absence of media monopolization and owing to the functioning of mechanisms (chiefly, at legislative level), which prevent such a monopolization. At the same time, the workings of executive power in Belarus have never aimed at allowing a real development of the free media (especially, electronic) market. On the contrary, they have always aimed at an opposite direction. With this course of events, a democratic perspective of this country’s development has been out of the question. In this regard, coming to power by the revenge totalitarian forces in 1994 was pre-determined. Naturally, a free media market was not created also because only the minority part of Belarusian society had had a need for that back then. Unfortunately, the current situation is hardly more optimistic. Alternative thoughts, expressed on television, radio or in print media have not fitted into the mythologized consciousness of a large portion of our citizens. Those who used to believe (or disbelieve) only, were forced to think by the alternative view on things, and they found it irritating. It is well known that a Soviet person feared the most to face a choice and be responsible for the choice already made. At the same time, the alternative media not only demonstrated this choice, but also forced to take up responsibility against his will.
Why do authorities today allow the existence of some opposition print media, although putting obstacles in their way? Mistaken are those, who think that the authorities are influenced by some humanistic views or by their fear to violate internationally recognized standards. The answer to this question is, by the way, obvious. The print media all together cannot form a serious competition to the state-controlled electronic media.
The current totalitarian media-cracy is primarily an electronic one. Therefore, as long as a narrow circle of the people at power has a possibility of keeping a television “button” under their control, democratic changes in the Belarusian society remain out of the question. The statement — “the struggle with the undemocratic regime” — should be replaced in program proclamations of political forces with the expression — “the liquidation of totalitarian electronic media-cracy”. With the today’s technical potential of the media, this question does not look unresolved. In practice, it requires a huge investment of funds and a more serious engagement of the intellectual potential of our civil society. It is extremely difficult to do, but Belarusians have no other way out, if they really want to see the light in the end of the tunnel.
In this regard, other questions arise. For instance, is the mythologized consciousness of a large portion of our compatriots going to change in the near future? Is creation and dissemination of the new “humanistic” myths the only way of restoring communication with this part of the society? Or, should one “tell the truth and only the truth whatever bitter it is” to this part of the population? Answers to these questions may differ. However, in my understanding, none of the options can be realized in the near future in principle, especially because the totalitarian electronic media-cracy, supported with huge material injections by the current political regime, continues to exist in the country.
Uladzimir KOLAS, Belarusian Association of Journalists
DANCES ON THE RAKE FROM EXPERIENCE OF USING THE SOVIET MENTALITY IN THE POST-SOVIET BELARUS
I believe this audience does not expect me to characterize the current situation in Belarus. However, as it often happens, the long since formulated and already customary assessments of a certain phenomenon sometimes push into the background some additional unnoted nuances and circumstances, which could expose more fully and explain its essence. Therefore, it would make sense to analyze this situation in terms of the role, which media played and continue to play today.
To understand the importance of this role, let us note that it is the media, in particular, television, what helped the current head of state get the power into his hands. It is the live and complete televised transmissions of Supreme Soviet (Belarus Parliament) sessions in the romantic times of perestroika and glasnost that served as a suitable tribune for an energetic and capable populist politician, and allowed, with no especial effort or waste of money, energy or time, to enter every apartment, every household and get in contact there with what is called as the mass post-Soviet consciousness.
Since this consciousness was not really a virginal tabula rasa, but was the product of a long and thorough work of the Soviet mass propaganda machinery, the seeds of populism got into a well-fertilized soil and gave birth to strong off-springs, which have been flourishing and giving fruits today. The grains of truth and common sense, on the contrary, have had hard times to get used to this soil and have not until now straightened up, being covered by spreading burdocks of aggressive and cynical propaganda. This was happening right in the times of glasnost triumph, when democratic intelligentsia both in Belarus and other republics of the former Soviet Union, were in the state of euphoria from the unlimited freedom of speech.
So, in the beginning of Perestroika the start-up situation in Belarus was similar to those in all the other Soviet republics, including Russia. The level of consciousness of electoral majority was common for all, too. But, why did the situation develop in such a peculiar way as it did in Belarus? Why in Belarus did the freedom of speech give power to the forces, which later turned the freedom of speech to the opposite?
To answer these questions, let us recall the difference, which existed in the Soviet Union between the central, Moscow-based, media and those in the provinces, Soviet republics. Let us recall that central newspapers, television and radio were expected to be the most interesting, rich in content, bright and talented. This deliberate directive of the Soviet ideological services was carried out with immaculate accuracy. The central mass media had both a much higher level of financial and logistical support and working conditions of a better quality. Besides, the staff of Soviet central information organs was allowed to have the other level of the freedom of opinions and interpretation of events. Therefore, the most capable and politically advanced journalists, who would become outcasts for their independent position and critical materials in the provinces, tended to “seek the truth” in Moscow, where they would get affectionate treatment and shelter (or often get tamed). The opportunity of getting through to Moscow and getting publicized in Pravda or Izvestia would guarantee a disgraced provincial freedom-seeker an indulgence at the local level and surround him with the areola of inviolability. It would also legitimize his/her ideas and projects in the eyes of local authorities, who had earlier regarded them as odious and hostile. Owing to this simple mechanism and selection, the mass media often seemed to be gray, dull and poor in the content. One could very seldom come across a truly professional and bright material in them. Such situation served a bad service in that crucial time when the people of Belarus unexpectedly received the opportunity of choosing their leaders freely.
Busy with an out-dated fight against the old (Communist) party nomenclature, who had long before seen no future in the Communist model and begun market reforms, the independent press, just like the whole pro-democracy community, did not pay a necessary attention to the danger. And that danger was growing strong thanks to the perestroika-times democratic freedoms.
Similar situation also occurred in Russia, where contrary to general expectations and convictions, democrats did not gain the majority in the first democratic elections to the Duma (Russian Lower House of parliament). Openly populist politician, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, smartly speculated on ideological stereotypes from the Soviet times to win the majority of votes. However, the media acted differently. With the support from power elite, which had already tasted private property and, thus, had not wanted to return to a planned economy, the highly-professional analysts from the Moscow-based media immediately started a hard-edged fight with Zhirinovsky’s populism and lowered him gradually down to the role of a clown. He has still been allowed to shape and voice irrational attitudes and aspirations of the lower class in the society, yet only in order to destroy them more easily, helping the Russian electoral majority get rid of the Soviet mentality rudiments.
In Belarus, the truly independent journalistic analysis did not exist. Furthermore, not long before the main information and political battles were taking place, Genadz Buraūkin, a brave and professional director of Belarusian State Television and Radio, under whose management the television and radio was on the rise, had been sent to an honorary exile. He was replaced by a series of impersonal executives. As a result, the Belarus’ most influential media turned out to be unable to either consolidate the society and assist in searching for and identifying the prospects for the country’s development or cover events, social processes and problems objectively.
Thus, due to a combination of several factors and the above-described causes, power fell into the single man’s hands. This person had had neither political career, relevant for a country’s leader, nor sufficient experience. This figure emerged as a certain materialization of irrational beliefs and stereotypes of electoral majority, shaped by the Soviet propaganda. For those who adhered to the common sense and naively thought that simply telling the truth would be sufficient for success in politics, it was an unexpected and instructive victory.
To my great regret, that surprisingly easy victory has until now prevented the Belarus’ current leadership from realizing that their pattern of economic social and cultural policy, which looks back into the “happy” past, is hopeless and dangerous. The situation, in which they have found themselves and which will continue to deteriorate, is not at all enviable. Clearly, it would be important for the Belarusian society to avoid as mush as possible the consequences of such an unenviable situation. However, it is rather unlikely. It is worth noting here the state of Belarusian media and their conformity with the role, which they must play in the cause of consolidation of the society and defining prospects for its development.
I think there is no point in reflecting in detail on the work of the official mass media, which very seldom go beyond the boundaries of a usual ideological and propaganda service to any regime.
Concerning the independent media and with all my respect to what they are doing, it is worth noting that the results of their workings can to some extent be judged by the situation, in which they have found themselves along with the whole society. Taking into consideration all those objective problems like administrative pressure, economic discrimination, criminal prosecution of journalists, one should mention something different. In this regard, let us look at the Soviet heritage, which is not very easy to get rid of, as the practice shows.
Unfortunately, the disappearance of the Soviet Empire from geographical maps has not deleted its projections from our mind and our consciousness. Very often, when reading numerous materials in the Belarusian independent, mainly Russian-language, press, I am asking myself with what geopolitical area the author associates the country, in which he/she lives and writes about? Why do events that take place across the eastern border, often get into first page headlines and covered as being important for Belarus? Why do newspapers waste their pages on huge interviews with different Russian star figures? When reading those interviews, you clearly understand that the aim of the interview was not to hear answers to banal and beaten-off questions. Rather, they aimed to satisfy a provincial thirst: to stand by a famous capital-based figure under his glory rays and display your membership in the “central” environment, thus, standing out of a provincial one.
The Chekhov’s three-sisters-style moaning, with which some well-known independent journalists and sometimes the whole newspapers respond to the developments of Belarusian reality; restoration and permanent strengthening on newspaper pages of the virtual cultural space of the empire that no longer exists also are the rudiments of the Soviet mentality, but not only. These are also the rudiments of the former colonial cultural dependence. This leads to the situation when even pro-independence people, not to mention those who associate themselves with the Russian information space, have a quite confused perception of these notions after reading the Russian-language independent press.
Traditional relations between the Belarusian and Moscow-based press as “provincial and central” produce a significant influence on the professional quality of Belarusian journalists. The use of ready-made language and notion clichés, produced by the Moscow-based media, provides for a trendy, “capital-style” wording of newspaper materials. However, it also destroys the ability of analyzing events independently and producing original thoughts and making your own point.
This, in return, gives birth to a perfunctory and arrogant attitude to the events, which are taking place in the country. Events are perceived as something unimportant compared to the developments taking place in the virtual “center”, still located across our eastern border.
The provincial disease of our independent press also is expressed by the unwillingness and, possibly, inability of searching for and off-spinning of the local leaders. It is not accidental that only those representatives of the Belarusian elite, who were fired, beaten or imprisoned by the authorities, can enjoy attention of the independent press. In other events, they are recalled only in connection with some scandals. They are very seldom mentioned in connection with some more or less significant social or cultural events.
Thus, the image of Belarusian elite as complete losers is getting strengthened, while the vast majority of the population remains to be ruled by apathy and the feeling of being unable to change the situation in the country.
This position matches paradoxically with that of the independent press’ chief opponent — the authorities, which aim to create a unified Belarus-Russian state. Furthermore, such position voiced by a part of independent Belarusian press strengthens illusory convictions of the Russian public about the future of our country, which traditionally sees Belarus as a part of the Russian Empire and regards our sovereignty as something unnatural.
The effect of imperial rake, left in front of our feet since the Soviet times, also worked at the recent presidential elections, when Belarusians once again had an opportunity of changing the situation in the country. The election took place on such a shamefully no-alternative basis not only thanks to the opposition, which failed to propose a national-scale leader, but also owing to the independent media, which turned out to be unable to analyze developments in the country and contribute to the public opinion shaping and singling out of a leader who could consolidate the society for a democratic change.
If this situation maintains, new mistakes in future crucial moments are likely to repeat.
My intervention today is polemical, it does not pretend to present a comprehensive analysis of the workings of the Belarusian media. Therefore, in order to draw attention to the issue, I have a little bit exaggerated the colors.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep respect for the independent media and journalists, who do this difficult and dangerous work. I would also like to express my appreciation for support, which they always rendered in difficult times and, I hope, will continue to render to the Belarusian Lyceum, which I head.
I do not call to self-isolate and get focused on the Belarusian reality exclusively. But, the time has long since come to revise priorities of attention to the events, which take place in Belarus and abroad, and concentrate, in the first place, on understanding our own Belarusian problems. Nobody will do it for us.